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Unfitness to plead and restraining orders: “a lacuna in the court’s armoury” 
R v Chinegwundoh [2014] EWCA Crim 2649 
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The applicant, C, had been a practising barrister. He claimed “very substantial fees”, to which he was 
not entitled, from a litigant who had been granted a legal aid certificate. The litigant had previously 
owned an interest in a property in Hackney, and C held a deluded belief that he was entitled to a 
charge over the property to satisfy the imagined debt. C fraudulently obtained a writ of possession 
and hired enforcement agents to evict the lawful occupiers, causing them “considerable anguish and 
distress”.  C also instructed an estate agency to sell the property, costing them time and money, and 
causing further distress to the occupants. 
C was charged with using a false instrument (namely the fraudulently obtained writ of possession) 
and fraud. On 14
th
 October 2013, C was found unfit to plead. On 21
st
 October 2013, a hearing took 
place under s.4A(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (“CP(I)A”) and a jury found that C 
had done the acts charged against him. The judge made a supervision order for a period of two 
years, requiring C “to attend as an out-patient South London Maudsley Hospital under the 
supervision of Dr Hurn or her appointed colleagues”. As C had subjected the occupants of the 
Hackney property to a “frightening ordeal”, the judge also imposed a restraining order until further 
order, prohibiting C “from contacting, approaching or communicating [sic] either directly or 
indirectly or attempting to do so”  the owner and tenants of the property and two other named 
persons. 
C applied for leave to appeal against the jury’s findings. He submitted 55 grounds of appeal, all of 
which were rejected by the single judge. C renewed his application to the full court. 
On 10
th
 December 2014, at the commencement of the hearing, C submitted a notice of 
abandonment. As the notice was not served in advance of the hearing, C could only abandon his 
application with the Court’s permission (CrimPR 65.13(2)(b)). The Court entertained doubts about 
C’s capacity to abandon his application, given that there was no evidence that C was now fit to 
plead. Further, although the Court was not impressed by any of C’s grounds of appeal, staff in the 
Criminal Appeal Office had identified problems with both the Supervision Order and the Restraining 
Order. The Court proceeded to hear the application, and appointed counsel to act on C’s behalf in 
accordance with s.4A(2)(b) CP(I)A.  
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL IN PART, the supervision order would be quashed and replaced with 
an order that identified the relevant local social services authority and named a social worker who 
would supervise the order, as required by sch.1A to the CP(I)A. “Particular care” is required when 
drafting supervision orders, “for sorting them out on appeal is wasteful of valuable time and 
resources” (at [18]). 
The restraining order would be quashed. Section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
permits a restraining order to be made upon conviction, and s.5A permits the making of a restraining 
order following an acquittal. Following a determination that the accused is unfit to plead, a finding 
that he did the acts or made the omissions charged against him 
acquittal. Consequently, there was no power to impose a restraining order alongside the supervision 
order.  
Commentary 
Section 4A of the CP(I)A provides that, following a determination that the accused is under a 
disability (i.e. unfit to plead), a jury must decide whether they are satisfied that he did the act or 
made the omission charged against him as the offence. If the jury finds that the accused did the 
relevant act or made the relevant omission, the Crown Court must make a hospital order (with or 
without a restriction order), a supervision order, or an absolute discharge (s 5 of the CP(I)A, as 
amended). Sch 1A to the CP(I)A provides that a supervision order must specify either the local social 
services authority or the local justice area in which the supervised person will reside (para 3), and 
must specify the social worker or probation officer who will supervise the order (para 1). A 
supervision order may also include a requirement that the accused submits to treatment by or at the 
direction of a named medical practitioner with a view to the improvement of his mental condition 
(para 4). In the instant case, the order specified only the medical practitioner who would supervise 
out-patient treatment; it did not name the supervising authority or supervising officer.  
The Court of Appeal substituted a new order, drafted in accordance with sch 1A. Counsel appointed 
on behalf of the defendant was able to identify a social worker who was prepared to supervise the 
order. In some cases, difficulties may arise because sch.1A provides that a court “shall not” make a 
supervision order unless “the supervising officer intended to be named in the order is willing to 
undertake the supervision” (para 2). The Law Commission recently published Unfitness to Plead: An 
Issues Paper (2 May 2014), in which consultees are invited to consider whether the Crown Court 
should have the power to compel local social services authorities and local probation boards, or 
providers of probation services, to accept supervision of an unfit accused (paras 6.11-6.14 ). In the 
meantime, if it is not possible to identify a supervising entity and a supervising officer, a supervision 
order cannot be made. 
The inability to impose a restraining order upon an unfit accused is a further “lacuna in the court’s 
armoury” (at [27]). Section 5 of the CP(I)A seeks “…to treat, rehabilitate and support while, in the 
most serious cases, providing protection for the public” (R v Wells [2015] EWCA Crim 2, at [3]). In 
addition to a hospital order, supervision order, or absolute discharge, the Crown Court has the 
power to impose various ancillary orders upon disposal. For example, the court may make: a Violent 
Offender Order (Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 99); a Foreign Travel Order (Sexual 
Offences Act, s 116); and/or a Sexual Offences Prevention Order (Sexual Offences Act, s 104) (or a 
Sexual Harm Prevention Order after 8
th
 March 2015, when s 113 and sch 5 of the of the Anti-social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 come into force). If the accused was charged with a sexual 
offence, he may be subject to the notification requirements in Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003. The biometric data of an unfit accused may be retained under the same terms as if he had 
been convicted of the offence (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 65B). These statutes 
specifically state that the court’s powers extend to those who are under a disability and have been 
found to have done the act charged against them. 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 makes restraining orders available where a person is 
convicted (s.5 ) or acquitted (s.5A) of any offence. The Act does not define “conviction” or 
“acquittal” to encompass those who are unfit to plead. A finding under s.4A of the CP(I)A that the 
accused did the relevant act is plainly not a conviction because the accused, being unfit to plead, has 
not been tried for the offence (see R v M [2002] 1 WLR 824 and R v Wells [2015] EWCA Crim 2). In 
the present case, prosecution counsel sought to argue that a finding that an unfit accused did the act 
is effectively an acquittal. In R v Mark John Smith [2012] EWCA Crim 2566 and R v R(AJ) [2013] EWCA 
Crim 591, the Court of Appeal held that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is an acquittal for 
the purposes of s.5A of the 1997 Act. However, in certain circumstances, an unfit accused who “did 
the act” may be remitted for trial if his mental health recovers, indicating that such a finding is not 
an acquittal (R v R(AJ) at [13-14] and Chinegwundoh at [24]). 
The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 amended the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 to make restraining orders available for those who are convicted or acquitted of any offence. 
The Act does not cover those who are unfit to plead and have been neither convicted nor acquitted, 
and this appears to be an anomaly. Where a judge has determined that an accused is unfit to plead 
and a jury finds that he did the act charged against him, a restraining order is not available, even 
though “persons under a disability can present risks to others of harassment” (at [27]). Conversely, if 
the jury are not satisfied that an unfit accused did the relevant act, “they shall return a verdict of 
acquittal as if… the trial had proceeded to a conclusion” (s 4A(4) of the CP(I)A), and the judge may 
make a restraining order under s 5A of the 1997 Act. Although the ability to make restraining orders 
should perhaps be extended to all those who are unfit to plead, the court concluded “that is a power 
that can only be provided by Parliament…” (at [27]). 
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